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Intellectual Property and Competition 
Herbert Hovenkamp1 
I. Introduction: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law 
A legal system that relies on private property rights to promote economic development 
and progress must consider that profits can come from two different sources.  First, both 
competition under constant technology and innovation promote economic growth by granting 
some returns to the successful developer and some to society.  An effective innovation policy 
will ensure developer returns adequate to compensate for its investment and risk.  Competition 
and innovation both increase output.  Second, however, profits can also come from practices that 
reduce output, in some cases by reducing quantity, or in others by reducing innovation. 
  IP rights (IPRs) and competition policy were once regarded as being in conflict.  IPRs 
create monopoly, which was thought to be inimical to competition.  By contrast, competition 
policy favors free entry and asset mobility, which IPRs limit in order to create incentives.  Today 
our view of this relationship is more complex.  First, most IPRs are insufficient to produce 
durable monopoly, although they do facilitate product differentiation.  Second, we tend to see IP 
rules as creating a property rights system in which competition exists for the property rights 
themselves.  Firms compete by innovating and appropriating whatever payoffs they can capture, 
including IPRs.  Third, and most importantly, we define competition in terms of output or 
welfare rather than simple rivalry.  A market structure or practice that increases output is more 
"competitive" than a lower output alternative, even though the amount of immediate rivalry 
among firms is less.  For example, output in the cellular phone market is much higher because 
hardware, software, and telecommunications links are all networked by cooperative agreements 
and standard setting. 
 Under conventional neoclassical assumptions, both innovation and competition increase 
output, whether measured by the number of units or their quality.  At the same time, however, 
excessive IP protection limits competition by reducing asset mobility further than necessary to 
facilitate innovation.  The policy trick is to find the “sweet spot” where the aggregate effects of 
IP competition and exclusion are optimized. 
It is firmly established that innovation contributes significantly more to economic growth 
than does competition under constant technology. (Solow, 1957; Bohannan and Hovenkamp, 
2012; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Aghion and Howitt, 1998).   While the theoretical and 
empirical literature employ different and sometimes inconsistent models, all agree on this basic 
conclusion (Helpman, 2004: Schumpeter, 1943; Solow, 1956; Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 
2007).   In addition, the "debate" between Joseph Schumpeter's (1943) position that monopoly is 
more favorable to innovation and Kenneth Arrow's (1962) position that competition is more 
favorable is somewhat settled, mainly in Arrow's favor.  A broad consensus today is that the 
market structure/innovation curve is a lopsided, inverted "U." (Scott and Scott, 2014; Arai, 2013; 
Aghion, et al., 2005).   Neither monopoly nor atomistic competition is especially conducive to 
innovation.  Rather, most innovation occurs in moderately competitive, product differentiated 
                                                          
1James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and Wharton Business, University of Pennsylvania.  
Thanks to Peter S. Menell and Erik Hovenkamp for comments.. 
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markets.  Some more recent literature tilts the inverted U more to the competitive side, 
concluding that on balance more competition yields more innovation (Hashmi, 2011; Schmitz 
and Holmes, 2010; see Menell and Scotchmer, 2007, pp., 1526-1530). 
 Although the relationship between innovation and economic growth is clear, the 
relationship between innovation rates and particular IPR systems is not.  One problem is that 
while IP systems may encourage innovation, they also act as impediments to the diffusion or 
cumulation of ideas through the economy (Menell & Scotchmer, 2007; Moser, 2013).  The 
literature on the relationship between the strength of patent systems and the rate of economic 
growth is at best inconclusive, with most of it suggesting little or no correlation. (Gould & 
Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997; Belleflamme, 2006).2  Relatively little literature exists that 
correlates innovation or growth rates with the existence or strength of any specific patent 
doctrine, although there is a robust "meta" empirical literature on the behavior of courts or judges 
with respect to certain doctrines (Rantanen, 2013 (nonobviousness); Mojibi, 2010 
(nonobviousness); Anderson & Menell, 2013 (claim construction); Seaman, 2012 (willful 
infringement); Crouch, 2010 (written description)). 
 Further, the innovation effect of IPRs is market specific, just as is true of other market 
characteristics such as economies of scale, product differentiation, ease of entry, or nature of 
information flow.  The competitive impact of IPRs also varies with differences in industry 
structure and the market position of the rights owners.  For example, for a dominant firm 
additional IP protection may serve to entrench or prolong its monopoly position, while the same 
right held by a small rival might serve to destabilize the dominant firm and make the industry 
more competitive.  Therefore, who gets a particular IPR can be important for competition policy. 
 That IPR performance varies from one market to another seems beyond dispute.  For 
example, chemical and pharmaceutical innovations tend to benefit from a robust patent system 
with protection of fairly long duration.  By contrast, in some markets for information 
technologies the patent system is much less valuable and may even produce greater harms than 
benefits.  The same thing is true of copyright.  For example, many books have long economic 
lives and can benefit from a lengthy term of protection, while more journalistic writing and 
software does not. The optimal term may also vary with the degree of market competitiveness, 
with greater competition conducive to shorter terms (Debrock, 1985).  Further, a tradeoff exists 
between duration and breadth: a patent with a shorter life but broader protection may provide the 
same incentives as one with longer life but narrower protection. (Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990; 
Merges & Nelson, 1990; Khoury, 2010). 
                                                          
2 One study finds a correlation between the existence of a patent system and total factor production (TFP) 
growth, but also concludes that there is an inverse correlation between the strength of patent rights and 
TFP growth. (Chang, 2014). The authors conclude that while patent rights lead to more patents, "our 
findings also suggest that patent rights slow the diffusion of new innovations throughout the economy, as 
we find that the effect of patents on TFP growth is weaker in countries with stronger patent rights. Our 
results suggest that finding the optimum level of patent protections requires the consideration of these two 
offsetting effects."  See also Falvey, 2006 (at least in middle income countries, IPRs cause more harm by 
restricting the dissemination of technology than they contribute to economic growth).  For an 
experimental test, see Torrance and Tomlinson, 2011, which find an inverse relationship between 
innovation and patenting. 
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 Unfortunately, our knowledge about market diversity has had little impact on the creation 
or application of intellectual property law, which is not particularly sensitive to issues of market 
structure, information transmittal, ease of copying, and other barriers to market entry or mobility.  
This is in very sharp contrast to antitrust law, which is acutely sensitive to market differences, 
perhaps overly so.  For example, questions concerning the legality of a merger or allegedly 
monopolistic practice can be answered only after a detailed expert inquiry into the markets at 
issue and the rationally expected results of certain practices.  By contrast, questions of patent 
validity, scope and infringement are largely indifferent to the markets in which these queries 
occur.  Likewise, the legislated term of IPR protections is largely invariant to the particular 
market in which the protected product is sold. 
 Because our information about the relationship between innovation and specific IP rules 
is so inadequate, opinions often go to extremes.  Some believe that the patent or other IP systems 
are worthless or even harmful because they hinder rather than promote innovation (e.g., Boldrin 
& Levine, 2008), while others defend IPRs enthusiastically (e.g., Epstein, 2010; Mossoff, 2013).  
Even within the United States Supreme Court these views have gyrated from periods when the 
Court was extremely tolerant of patenting and patent practices, to periods in which it struck 
down nearly every patent it encountered and held exaggerated views about the anticompetitive 
effects of patent practices (Hovenkamp, 2015d). 
 Further, IPRs are hardly the only inducement to innovation, and their relative importance 
varies from one market to another.  When firm managers are questioned, a plurality believe that 
the biggest inducement is first mover advantages, while patent protection is at best secondary.  
(Bohannan and Hovenkamp, 2012, pp. 100–102).3 In some markets, such as digital content, copying 
is so cheap and quick that little innovation would occur but for IP protection.  Innovations in 
processes that are not readily observable or reverse engineered might be better protected by 
simple first mover advantages or trade secrets.  Patent protection is secondary and may even be 
counterproductive to the extent that patenting requires disclosure.  Some markets exhibit high 
rates of innovation without any intellectual property protection at all (Raustiala & Sprigman, 
2012). 
 The lack of empirical validation for specific IP rules is troublesome, because some rules 
may be far from optimal.  A good example is the way that patent law's requirement of 
nonobvious subject matter (35 U.S.C. §103) is administered.  Because patent infringement does 
not require copying or even knowledge of another's patent, it is crucial that the nonobviousness 
requirement be interpreted strictly, keeping patent issuance within proper bounds: we do not 
want to give patents on things that independent entrepreneurs would develop on their own.  An 
empirically-based inquiry into nonobviousness would consider the extent to which new 
technology results from copying rather than independent invention, a forward looking inquiry. 
Whether one can infer nonobviousness from commercial success is debatable, but doubtful (Merges, 
1988).  But in any event that is not how nonobviousness subject matter is actually determined.  
Patent examiners or courts deciding infringement cases assess nonobviousness, or "inventive 
step," by looking backward through prior art.  By contrast, entrepreneurs think forward, 
considering new things to try from their current position.  The likely result is that far too many 
patents are granted on things that other businesses develop on their own in the ordinary course of 
                                                          
3 On the use of alternative funding mechanisms, such as prizes or direct government finance of research, 
see Menell and Scotchmer, 2007, at 1530-1534. 
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competition.  The recent experience with non-practicing patent holders in information 
technology markets suggests as much.  Most of the defendants in those cases are independent 
developers rather than copyists. 
 The statutory systems of competition law and IPRs differ significantly from one another. 
Most of the United States antitrust laws are highly general and do not reflect specific "deals" 
between legislators and particular special interests. The Sherman and Clayton Acts simply 
condemn practices that "restrain trade," "monopolize," or have effects that "may be substantially 
to lessen competition."4 As a result, assessment of specific practices is left largely to judges.   In 
addition, after more than thirty years of redefinition and retrenchment, antitrust policy in the 
United States has become much more focused on promoting consumer welfare, which it does by 
facilitating structures or practices that maximize output, measured by quantity or quality 
(Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2012). 
 By contrast, most IPR systems are detailed codes that reflect considerable producer 
involvement but relatively little input from consumers.  The 1976 Copyright Act currently in 
force, together with the Copyright Term Extension Act, are examples (Bohannan, 2006; Patry, 
1996), but the patent laws are not far behind (Merges, 2000).   For example, over history 
Congress has repeatedly granted retroactive term extensions to both patents and copyrights 
(Ochoa, 2001; Hovenkamp, 2016c).  Retroactive extensions do not facilitate innovation to the 
extent that the inventions to which they apply have already been created.  They are pure rent 
seeking, prolonging exclusive rights and reducing output.  Such extensions have come to the 
Supreme Court twice, 150 years apart.  In Bloomer v. McQuewan, 1852, the Supreme Court held 
that retroactive patent extensions could not be applied to patented articles that had already been 
sold, thus creating the foundation for the modern patent "exhaustion" doctrine. (Hovenkamp, 
2016b, 2016c).  In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2003, the Supreme Court upheld a retroactive extension of 
the copyright term. 
 This history is unsettling because consumer welfare should be the ultimate goal of 
innovation policy just as it is of traditional competition policy.  Consumers profit from lower 
prices and higher innovation rates, giving them the correct set of incentives to determine optimal 
IP rules.  By contrast, producer incentives are more mixed.  While producers profit from lower 
costs and increased innovation, they also profit from increased protection for their own IPRs or 
reduced protection for the innovations of rivals, whether or not these protection levels are 
optimal (Hovenkamp, 2014). 
II. The Relationship Between the IP Policy and Antitrust Policy 
A. Approaches to Market Diversity 
 While the antitrust laws do not explicitly require different analysis for different markets, 
the spare, highly general statutes have been interpreted that way at least since the Supreme 
Court's Chicago Board of Trade decision in 1918.  That decision approved an agreement that 
literally fixed prices for after hours trading occurring after the open market had closed.  Such 
                                                          
4 15 U.S.C.  §§ 1, 2, 14, 18.  One exception is the Robinson-Patman Act, which was in fact the product of 
a deal between retailers and Congress during the Great Depression. See 15 U.S.C. § 13.  See Hovenkamp, 
2015d, 225-232. 
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price fixing was unique to that market and, in the Court's view, promoted rather than restricted 
competition.  The antitrust merger provision contained in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18, 
condemns acquisitions whose “effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create 
a monopoly”—a requirement that has always been held to require highly specific market 
analysis.  For well over a half century the law of monopolization under Sherman Act § 2, 15 
U.S.C. §2, has required detailed inquiries into market structure, producing different outcomes in 
different industries. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 1945; United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 1956; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 1993. 
By contrast, IP law largely disregards market differences.  (For some qualifiers, see Burk 
and Lemley, 2003; Menell and Scotchmer, 2007).   Terms of protection are largely invariant to 
the industry, even though rates of technological turnover vary widely.  If protected technology or 
expression routinely becomes obsolete in the market before IPRs expire, then the Constitution's 
provision authorizing Congress to create patents or copyrights only for "limited times" (U.S. 
Const., art. I, §8, cl. 8), is largely meaningless. The premise of that provision is that the 
protection period should be sufficient to induce innovation, but after expiration the protected 
good goes into the public domain.   Even requirements such as nonobvious subject matter for 
patents generally avoid market specific questions about how information is disseminated in a 
particular market. 
An ideal IP policy truly concerned with innovation would need to develop more 
empirically driven, market specific rules, reflecting how innovation works in different situations, 
what amount and nature of inducement is required, and the extent of harm caused by the 
resulting exclusion.  Offsetting this, of course, would be the higher transaction and enforcement 
costs involved in enforcing a system that contemplates greater market diversity. 
 
B. Changing Attitudes Toward Antitrust and IP 
 Competition policy and IP policy should be regarded as complements.  They share 
economic welfare as a goal, and an optimal policy includes elements of both.   Public policy has 
been erratic, however, and the two legal systems have not always accommodated each other in 
socially beneficial ways.  Prior to 1917 the Supreme Court approved nearly every patent practice 
that had been alleged to restrict competition, including toleration of product price fixing in a 
patent pool (E. Bement and Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co.,1902); granting a dominant firm an 
injunction against infringement of an externally acquired but unpracticed patent (Cont'l Paper 
Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 1908); and permitting tying of patented and unpatented goods 
(Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 1912).  One important exception was Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. 
United States, 1912, which condemned a product price fix covering the entire bathroom fixture 
industry.  The price stipulation was included in a patent license for an enameling process that 
represented a minor component of the finished product. 
A single mention of patents in the 1914 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §14, provoked a dramatic 
change.  Beginning in the 1917 Motion Picture Patents case, which overruled Henry, the 
Supreme Court embarked on a war against patent practices thought to be anticompetitive, in the 
process developing an expansive, judge made doctrine of patent “misuse,” of which more later.  
Hovenkamp IP/Competition August,  2017, Page 6 
 
Beginning in the late 1930s the Supreme Court applied increasingly harsh standards for patent 
issuance, eliciting Justice Robert H. Jackson's famous complaint that “the only patent that is 
valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on."  Jungersen v. Ostby and 
Barton Co., 1949 (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
 Three dispersed events gradually turned the tide again.  First was the 1952 Patent Act, a 
significant revision, which restated the patentability requirement as “nonobvious” subject matter 
and also limited the reach of patent misuse law (Duffy, 2007; Hovenkamp, 2015d). The second 
was the establishment of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 1982, with a mandate to unify 
and strengthen patent law (Dreyfuss, 1989; Dreyfuss, 2008). The third development, which 
occurred more gradually and within antitrust and patent misuse law, was a doctrinal 
reformulation that required much more explicit proof of anticompetitive effects (Bohannan & 
Hovenkamp, 2012). The high point of antitrust hostility toward perceived patent abuses was 
1970, when the U.S. Antitrust Division issued its "nine no nos" of patenting that were almost 
certain to provoke an antitrust challenge (Wilson, 1970; Hovenkamp, 2015d).  Today nearly all 
of the "nine no nos," including such things as mandatory packaging licensing, grantback clauses, 
reach through royalties, and resale price maintenance, are widely regarded as competitively 
benign in most situations (Hovenkamp, 2015a).  Antitrust courts and scholars increasingly came 
to believe that many post-issuance patent practices that had been condemned as “misuse” were in 
fact competitively harmless.  This was particularly true of tying arrangements, the most frequent 
generator of misuse findings, as well as vertical price and nonprice restraints, package licensing, 
provisions that tied royalty payments to unpatented goods, and most unilateral refusals to license.  
(Bowman, 1973; Hovenkamp, 2018a). 
 One important result of significant antitrust revision is that overreaching is less likely to 
occur today than it was thirty years ago.  By contrast, patent law has continued on an expansion 
course in both issuance and doctrine that until recently seemed unstoppable.  Today antitrust law 
is in a much better position to accommodate concerns about innovation than patent law is to 
accommodate concerns for competition.  Antitrust law's sensitivity to innovation manifests itself 
in several ways.  One is a very broad rule that innovation itself can almost never be an antitrust 
violation, no matter how exclusionary, as several courts have held.  See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic 
Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 2010; In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litig., 
2014. See also Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2009-2015, ¶776.  One limited exception is situations 
where the cost of product changes is very small in relation to competitive harm and the changes 
are readily reversible.  This is true mainly of software, where a minor change in code can serve 
to make rivals' products incompatible (Newman, 2012). Another area is the deferential treatment 
that the courts have afforded to settlements of IP lawsuits.  For example, in Clorox Co. v. 
Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 1997, the court approved a market division agreement settling a 
trademark dispute.  See Hovenkamp (2015a). A third area is increasingly strict limitations on the 
use of antitrust to challenge anticompetitive IP infringement actions, as created by the Supreme 
Court in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp.,1965, but limited by 
Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 2007.  (See Bohannan and Hovenkamp, 2012, pp,. 290-324).  Yet 
another is deferential treatment of technology sharing agreements under antitrust law, which 
rarely condemns them unless they involve explicit restraints in the product market (Hovenkamp, 
2015a). 
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 By contrast, patent case law sometimes operates as if competition were the affirmative 
evil to be resisted.  One example is the Federal Circuit's 2014 decision in Trebro Mfr., Inc. v. 
Firefly Equip., LLC 2014.  See Hovenkamp and Cotter, 2015.  The court permitted a dominant 
firm in a concentrated market to enjoin patent infringement on unpracticed patents.  The 
dominant firm had purchased two patents from a third party that covered an alternative 
technology to that in its own product. After the acquisition, it continued to use its older 
technology and brought an infringement suit against the defendant, a recent entrant whose 
technology very likely infringed the acquired patents.  The Federal Circuit distinguished a line of 
lower court decisions which had refused injunctions to non-practicing entities, following the 
Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 2006 (Sichelman, 2014).  In this 
case the patentee was actually competing in the market, even though it was not practicing the 
patent whose infringement was claimed.  No one apparently raised an antitrust issue.  
Nevertheless, the court's lack of foresight did considerable harm to competition by giving 
dominant firms an excuse to buy up competing technologies in order to keep them out of 
production, thus limiting the avenues through which new entry can occur. 
C. Assessing Anticompetitive Restraints: "Scope-of-the-patent" Test 
 Historically, competition policy presumed that an IP practice that increased the 
profitability of an IP right would also increase the incentive to innovate.  Competition law 
enforcers should stand aside if the practice fell "within the scope of the patent." (Hovenkamp, 
2015e).  This formulation originated in the nineteenth century as a rationale for the exhaustion, 
or "first sale," doctrine, which held that "when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, 
it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly." Bloomer v. McQuewan, 1852.  For example, 
even if a patent license limited the geographic range over which a good could be used, once the 
good was sold that right could no longer be enforced against the purchaser by means of a patent 
infringement suit. Adams v. Burke, 1873.  Later on the Supreme Court used the "beyond the 
scope" formulation to describe overly broad patent claim constructions, as in Coupe v. Royer, 
1895; or overly broad interpretations of the patent doctrine of equivalents, which extended patent 
coverage to things that did not literally fall within the patent’s claims.  See Johnson and 
Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Svce. Co., Inc., 2002, which concluded that a broad infringement 
claim under doctrine of equivalents was an attempt to extend patent beyond its rightful scope. 
(See also Sarnoff, 2005.)  Beginning in the 1930s, the formulation was also employed in patent 
"misuse" cases, particularly those involving the tying of unpatented goods.  The tie was said to 
extend the patent's power beyond its proper scope by bringing the unpatented tied product within 
the patent monopoly.  For example, in Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 1931, 
the Supreme Court held that a patentee’s tie of unpatentable dry ice to its patented ice box was an 
attempt to control "unpatented material" and thus "beyond the scope of the patentee's monopoly." 
 The scope-of-the-patent formulation was also used defensively, however, to exonerate 
practices challenged as anticompetitive but that were found to be within the patent's scope.  For 
example, in 1926 the Supreme Court upheld product price fixing contained in patent licenses on 
the theory that setting the product price was the patentee's right, and the licensee agreement did 
no more than retain that right, while transferring the right to produce to the licensee. (United 
States v. General Electric Co., 1926).  In the 1970s Ward Bowman's important book on patent 
and antitrust law envisioned the patent as a walled garden protecting everything within its scope, 
but not necessarily activities that spilled outside. (Bowman, 1973).  In its decision in United 
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States v. Line Material Co., 1948, however, the majority condemned a product price fix in a 
cross-license, over the dissent of three Justices who objected that the price fix was within the 
scope of the patent.  The dissenters in the Supreme Court's 2013 Actavis decision would have 
exonerated a settlement agreement in which a patentee paid an accused infringer a large sum to 
delay its entry into production, provided that the permitted entry date was prior to the expiry of 
the patent.  In that case, the settlement agreement would be no more exclusionary than a judicial 
determination of validity and infringement; thus the agreement fell within the scope of the 
patent. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 2013.  See Edlin, et al, 2015. 
 Pay-for-delay settlements came into existence with the passage of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, which rewards a generic firm for being the first to challenge a pioneer's patent or entering 
upon that patent's expiry.  Under the Act, no subsequent generic can enter the market until 180 
days after the first generic to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) actually starts 
producing.  Prior to generic production the patent is virtually immune from challenge by other 
potential competitors, because they have no right to produce in any event.  The situation gives 
the patentee and the generic infringement defendant a strong incentive to share the patent 
monopoly, thus largely eliminating adversity between them.  Under the "scope-of-the-patent" test 
the equilibrium duration of such an agreement is the remaining term of the patent, assuming that 
the antitrust laws permit such an agreement (Edlin, et al., 2014; Hovenkamp, 2015e).  That is, the 
joint-maximizing agreement for the settling parties would share the returns permitted by the 
patent for its full period. 
 But the Actavis majority rejected a scope-of-the-patent approach, perhaps heralding an 
important change in antitrust analysis of patent practices.  If patent rights are presumed to be 
valid, valuable, and clearly defined, then the scope-of-the-patent formulation functions much like 
similar scope formulations might do for, say, real property.  But if patents are of questionable 
validity, dubious value, or ambiguous scope, then the scope-of-the-patent formulation can permit 
significant anticompetitive overreaching.  This issue was highlighted in Actavis because the 
legislative framework largely immunized suspiciously weak patents from challenge while the 
pay-for-delay agreement was pending.  Further, because the owner of a robust patent would not 
pay much more than avoided litigation costs in order to enforce its rights, the high pay-for-delay 
payment (often several hundred million dollars) is a strong signal that the patent is invalid or, in 
a few cases, not infringed (Edlin, et al., 2013; Edlin, et al., 2014).  For example, a landowner 
attempting to exclude a trespasser would not pay the trespasser a large sum of money to stay off 
her land unless she had serious doubts about the validity of her legal claim.  If her title were good 
she could exclude the trespasser by paying nothing more than litigation costs. 
 In other cases, the scope-of-the-patent formulation fails, not because the patents in 
question are invalid, but because their value is very low in relation to the restraints in question.  
Licenses that include product price fixing are a good illustration.  Even for relatively sound 
patents, license fees range from .5 to 6 percent of sales, with rates below 3 percent being the 
norm.  The rates on individual patents can be much lower in patent intensive technologies such 
as computers and telecommunications.  Further, these rates are for licensed patents, and only a 
small percentage of patents are ever licensed.  By contrast, the markups of successful cartels 
often run in the range of 10 to 50 percent (Connor, 2014).  If the firms in an industry cross 
license their patents and also fix the product price, the agreement as measured by a scope-of-the-
patent test attributes the value of the entire cartel markup to the patents. 
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 Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Actavis held that courts evaluating such settlements 
need not address questions of patent validity or infringement.  That proposition is consistent with 
long-standing reluctance by federal judges to review the IP merits when considering 
competition-based challenges to settlements, except for obvious cases of patents that are almost 
certainly invalid or not infringed.  Most of those cases go on to uphold the settlement, however, 
while the Actavis decision did not. 
 More importantly, as Actavis recognized, antitrust's economic approach is designed to 
create appropriate incentives at the point of decision.  The relevant question is not the ex post one 
whether the patent was valid and infringed, but rather the ex ante question of what the parties' 
expectations were at the time the settlement was entered.  By settling, the parties have already 
implicitly agreed that getting a judicial determination of patent validity and infringement is not 
worth the cost and attendant risk of a judicial determination.  As a result, it makes little sense to 
insist on that same query before passing judgment on the settlement (Edlin, et al., 2015). 
 Of course, most settlements raise no competition issues because the settlements 
themselves tend to increase rather than decrease output.  The most common settlement of an IP 
infringement dispute is a production license under which the defendant pays the plaintiff for the 
right to produce.  Such a license is likely to increase rather than decrease output, but in any event 
production licenses are explicitly authorized by §261 of the Patent Act.  They are legal whether 
or not they are in settlement of litigation.  The more problematic settlements are those that fix 
product prices, divide product markets (as in Actavis), or in some cases that involve an 
agreement among the settlors not to license to or otherwise deal with third parties, such as the 
Supreme Court condemned in United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 1963. 
 Finally, one thing that makes an Actavis style pay-for-delay settlement unusual is that it 
does not involve a license at all, but at most an agreement to license at some future date. That is 
why Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court observed that, while the Patent Act explicitly permits 
licensing, the agreement providing for delayed entry was not authorized by the Patent Act.  
Indeed, an equilibrium agreement under the scope-of-the-patent test advocated by the dissenters 
would never be a license: for the entire remaining duration of the patent the generic would not 
produce.  Once the patent expires the generic is free to produce without a license.  Until actual 
production under a license occurs, the settlement is nothing more than a naked market division 
agreement.  Even so, Actavis held that the agreement in question should be addressed under 
antitrust's rule of reason, which requires proof of market power and anticompetitive effects.  It 
also held, however, that both power and harmful effects could be inferred from the large 
payment itself.5 
III. IP and Antitrust: Specific Issues and Applications 
 Prior to patent issuance the patent process operates under intensive government 
supervision and control.  To be sure, improper conduct in patent prosecution is not rare, but the 
patent system itself has tools for policing it.  Further, riding herd on the procedures and rules of 
other federal agencies is not antitrust’s purpose.  Even if we believe that the existing system 
                                                          
5 Reverse payments in the context of adjudication before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) can 
raise analogous issues.  See Hovenkamp and Lemus, 2016). 
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issues too many patents, that too many of these are worthless, or that the process has other flaws, 
these are virtually never antitrust problems.  This position is mandated by the ordinary antitrust 
rules of implied immunity, which limit or remove antitrust involvement from activities that are 
actively regulated by other federal agencies (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2009-2015). 
 Once a patent is issued, however, the situation is much different.  Patents are largely 
treated as property rights requiring little government supervision, other than the USPTO's power 
to re-examine, collect renewal fees, and a few other housekeeping matters (Hovenkamp, 2015c).  
Because issued patents are largely subject to private control, antitrust policy becomes relevant.  
One important factor is whether the practice in question is expressly authorized by the Patent 
Act.  Under the rules of express immunity, a practice that is compelled or authorized by a federal 
statute cannot be an antitrust violation, provided that the practice stays within the expressly 
authorized boundaries. 
 After considering how market power should be assessed in IP-intensive markets, this 
section briefly addresses specific intellectual property practices that might also be challenged as 
antitrust violations.  All are post-issuance practices and most of them are either not authorized by 
the Patent Act itself, or else they fall outside the scope of the authorization.  As a result, antitrust 
analysis is appropriate.  Of course, this does not mean that they are unlawful.  Nor does it entail 
that the presence of an IP right or license is irrelevant (Cotter, 2015). 
A. Assessing Market Power in IP Intensive Markets 
 No anticompetitive practice can succeed unless its participants have significant market 
power, which is the power profitably to raise prices above cost by reducing output.  This 
requirement applies both to anticompetitive exclusion and anticompetitive collusion.  To be sure, 
certain practices such as price-fixing are said to be unlawful "per se," which means that proof of 
illegality does not require a showing of market power.   This is not because market power is 
irrelevant, however.  To the contrary, naked practices such as price fixing, which produce no 
efficiency gains to the participants, are profitable only on the premise that power exists.  As a 
result, proper identification of the practice eliminates the need to assess market power separately 
(Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2009-2015). 
 In 2006 the Supreme Court overruled a half-century old presumption that a patent 
conferred sufficient market power on its owner to make certain anticompetitive practices such as 
tying unlawful. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 2006, overruling International 
Salt Co. v. United States, 1947.  In United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1962, the Supreme Court had 
also extended the presumption to copyrights, and a few lower courts had applied it to trademarks. 
E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 1971.  Most courts limited the presumption to tying cases, 
but where it applied the challenger needed to show only that the challenged restraint involved an 
IPR-protected product, and the requisite market power would then be presumed.  All these 
decisions are now overruled. 
 The end of the power presumption hardly means that IPRs are irrelevant to inquiries 
about market power. Today, they are properly regarded as an important factor in establishing 
power (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2009-2015).  A few very powerful patents and some software 
copyrights may have so much exclusionary power that they give their owners dominant market 
positions.  One likely historical example is Microsoft's Windows operating system, which is 
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protected from duplication by copyright and some patents. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
1999 and 2001.  Other good historical examples are the patents that protected Polaroid's self-
developing camera and film system, which Kodak tried in vain to invent around (Fierstein, 
2015), and the array of patents that Xerox acquired from outside inventors that led to its long-
held dominance of plain paper copying technology. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 1981.   
 Some aggregations of patents can become so essential to operation that they give 
significant market power to their owners, at least when the aggregation is owned by a single 
firm. Of course, aggregations of essential patents are often owned by pools in which a large 
number of firms have nonexclusive rights. Good examples are MPEG-LA, a patent pool and 
standards association whose members control standards for digital video technology; and 3GPP, 
whose members control the technology for 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications.  Once a 
particular patent in such a pool is declared "standards essential," it may be necessary for any firm 
wishing to compete in that technology to purchase a license.  That obligation can confer 
significant market power, limited by the fact that standards-essential patents, or SEPS, are also 
typically subject to FRAND (“fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory”) licensing obligations, 
which are generally interpreted to require licensing to willing participants at fair and 
nondiscriminatory rates (Contreras, 2015). 
So far there have been few antitrust cases challenging the creation and enforcement of 
SEPs or FRAND obligations, and these have been largely unsuccessful.  For example, Golden 
Bridge Technology, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 2008, rejected the antitrust claim of an inventor whose 
technology was rejected by a standard setting organization (SSO) in favor of alternative 
technologies.  Legal control of SEPs lies largely with patent law, contract law or the court's 
general equity powers.  In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 2014, the court held that the owner of a 
SEP could not obtain an injunction against a user; and in Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 
2008, the court applied the judge made doctrine of estoppel against one who reneged on its 
promise to subject its patents to a FRAND commitment.  At this writing Qualcomm is facing 
separate lawsuits brought by the Federal Trade Commission and Apple, claiming that Qualcomm 
is tying SEPs to devices that it sells, or licensing only on the condition that its patents be used 
exclusively with Qualcomm devices. (See E. Hovenkamp, 2018). 
 IPRs of all forms can limit asset mobility and facilitate product differentiation.  In such 
markets prices will be higher than short run marginal cost, even though the market has several 
competing firms.  The impact of IPRs in these situations depends heavily on the number of firms 
in a market and the strength of the IPRs in question.  Suffice it to say that many products from 
automobiles to computers to kitchen appliances contain numerous patents but are yet sold in 
moderately competitive, product differentiated markets. 
 One technical difficulty for assessing power is that IP development often requires high 
fixed costs invested at the front end, and fairly low marginal costs.  Whether acquisition costs are 
fixed or variable depends heavily on whether the IPRs in question are developed internally or 
licensed from outside inventors.  For example, internal research often is very costly at the front 
end and these costs, once invested, do not vary with output.  By contrast, licensing in the same 
technology by per unit or per dollar royalties becomes a variable cost to the licensee.   Most of 
the technical tools used for market power measurement examine the relationship between price 
and marginal cost.  The result can be false positives, depending on the prevalence of IPRs and 
the extent of fixed costs.   For example, an unpatented living room chair with a patented recliner 
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button may sell at a small markup over cost, reflecting licensing of the button patent.  At the 
other extreme, purely digital products such as streamed e-books, songs, or software may have 
distribution costs very close to zero, meaning that the licensor's entire price is markup.  In that 
case, any measure of market power based on the relationship between price and short run 
marginal cost will exaggerate the seller's power. 
 Because digital content is so easily duplicated, the ability to sell at a substantial markup 
over short run cost is largely a result of IP protection.  For example, one can obtain an e-book 
version of Moby Dick at a price of zero, even though it is very famous and widely read.  Moby 
Dick is in the public domain, which means that no one is earning a royalty on its sales and 
copying is free.  By contrast, the e-book version of a mediocre but recent novel will be much 
higher because royalties must be paid and it cannot be copied without a license from the 
publisher or author.  For antitrust purposes, the main takeaway from these situations is that 
assessment of price-cost margins is rarely a useful way of assessing market power in markets for 
purely digital goods.  Theoretically, one could address the problem by querying whether the 
returns to a product are significantly positive over its entire life.  For example, the fact that a 
digital computer program sells at a high ratio of price to short run cost tells us nothing if the 
product becomes obsolete or loses its commercial viability before recouping development costs.  
As a practical matter, these measurements can be very difficult to make, particularly when the IP 
right in question is a copyright with an effective duration of a century (Hovenkamp, 2016a). 
 With some exceptions, non-patent IPRs make even smaller contributions to power than 
do patents.  Copyrights and trademarks are easier to obtain than patents are.  A few highly 
popular publications or computer programs are counterexamples, but generally one cannot infer 
significant power merely from the existence of an IPR of any kind (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2009-
2015). 
B. Horizontal Restraints: Price Fixing and Market Division 
 A restraint is "horizontal" if the participants are competitors or would be competitors but 
for the restraint.  Identification of firms as "competitors" is usually a reference to the product or 
service markets in which the firms operate, although it may also refer to the technologies that 
they develop or license.  In any event, it is always important to distinguish restraints in the patent 
and licensing market from restraints in the product market. 
 An example is price-fixing.  Setting a price is inherent in licensing and rarely 
anticompetitive.  If firms cross-license, they must necessarily agree on the price that each will 
charge to the others, even if the price is zero.  Price fixing in the product market is another matter 
and is highly suspicious.  For example, firms with worthless patents or other IPRs might use 
licenses or cross-licenses as a cover for price fixing, as Judge Posner observed in his opinion in 
Asahi Glass v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 2003. 
 As noted previously, the competition problem with product price fixing actually reaches 
far beyond invalid patents.  Even if a patent is valid and essential, it may contribute only a small 
amount to a product's value.  As a result, the market price of the license can be far less than the 
cartel markup on the product. For this reason, product price fixes in IP licenses should be 
regarded as competitively harmful whether or not the IPRs in question are valid.  The corollary is 
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that product price fixes in patent licenses can be condemned without inquiry into patent validity 
or infringement. 
 Market division agreements operate economically much like price fixing.  By dividing up 
the market (by territory, customer, or product) a group of firms can create individual monopolies 
for themselves.  As a cartel device, market division can be superior to price fixing if the firms 
have differing costs or, for other reasons, disagree about the price that a cartel should charge.  
One important difference between price fixing and market division is that the Patent Act 
expressly authorizes patentees to grant exclusive licenses to "any part" of the United States (35 
U.S.C. §261), thus making most domestic territorial division agreements lawful.  While the 
Patent Act says nothing about licenses restricted to specific customers or products, these "field of 
use" restrictions are treated leniently, mainly because they are viewed as organizers of 
production enabling the patentee to take advantage of the unique characteristics of different 
producers.  For example, in General Talking Pictures v. Western Elec. Co., 1938, the Supreme 
Court upheld an arrangement in which the patentee reserved to itself the market for commercial 
use of its patented sound amplifier, while other licensees were authorized to make the amplifiers 
only for residential customers. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that field of use 
restrictions must be evaluated under antitrust’s rule of reason. B. Braun Med. v. Abbott Labs, 
1997.  Field of use restrictions become more suspect, however, if they take the form of product 
market division among competing manufacturers.  It is also worth noting that while §261 of the 
Patent Act authorizes an exclusive territory agreement between a patent owner and a licensee, it 
does not authorize agreements among the licensees themselves. 
 
 As is true of price fixing, the tolerance for market division agreements applies to the IP 
right, not to products that might include it.  For example, suppose that Ford patents a desirable 
windshield wiper blade and licenses Chrysler to sell cars with the patented blade in any state 
except California.  That would be a territorially restricted license expressly authorized by the 
Patent Act.  Ford could very likely also authorize Chrysler to put the blade only on its pickup 
trucks, but not its cars.  That would be a field-of-use restriction and would ordinarily be lawful 
under antitrust law's rule of reason.  What Ford could not do, however, is agree that Chrysler 
would not sell any pickup trucks in California, whether or not they contain the patented blade.  
That would be a restraint on the product market rather than on use of the patent.  Unless other 
factors suggesting joint development were present, that agreement would be unlawful per se 
under the antitrust laws. 
C. Vertical Restraints involving IPRs 
 A restraint is purely vertical when the parties stand in a buyer-seller relationship but are 
not actual or potential competitors in either the product market or the licensing market.  Because 
every licensee agreement has a buyer and seller, they are all vertical as to the IPR license itself.  
The more important question is the relationship of the parties in the underlying product (or 
service) market. Today the antitrust attitude toward vertical restraints is benign, although it was 
not always so (Hovenkamp, 2015d).  Resale price maintenance (RPM), vertical nonprice 
restraints, and tying were all once unlawful per se. 
 Vertical restraints come in two classes, generally called "intrabrand" and "interbrand," 
even though at least some of the products and services that they control are not branded at all.  A 
restraint is said to be intrabrand if it controls distribution only of the supplier's own product.  It is 
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interbrand if it places limits on the products of rivals.  The principal intrabrand price restraint is 
RPM, or seller dictation of the price at which its own product can be resold.  As a general rule, 
the fact that the price restraints are included in an IP license is irrelevant, and when the per se 
rule against RPM was in place it applied to patented and copyrighted goods, as well as those 
protected by trade secrets (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2009-2015). Since 2007, RPM has been 
assessed under the rule of reason. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, 2007, 
overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons, 1911.  Today, few instances are 
found to be unlawful. 
 Vertical nonprice restraints restrict a dealer's or retailer's sale of the supplier's own 
product in some way other than by setting price.  The most common ones are territorial 
restrictions, customer restrictions, and product restrictions.  There are also numerous others, such 
as restrictions regulating the hours that a firm is open for business, fast food franchise restrictions 
dictating menu items, employee uniforms, hours of operation, and the like.  Section 261 of the 
Patent Act expressly permits territorial restrictions in patent licenses, but in any event the 
Supreme Court has been applying the rule of reason to purely vertical nonprice restraints since 
its decision in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 1977.  They are rarely found to be 
unlawful. 
 The Copyright Act expressly permits many nonprice restrictions, both horizontal and 
vertical, by making separate statutory authorizations for the right to reproduce, to prepare 
derivative works, to distribute, to perform, and to display, depending on the nature of the 
copyrighted good (17 U.S.C. §106).  However, even a purely vertical licensing restriction that is 
not expressly authorized by the Copyright Act would probably be legal under the antitrust laws.  
Restrictions that attached to a copyrighted article after it is sold might not be enforceable under 
copyright law's statutory first sale doctrine.  See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2013.  
These are not antitrust challenges, however. 
 Interbrand vertical restraints, which include tying and exclusive dealing, have historically 
been treated with greater suspicion than intrabrand restraints, mainly because they can reduce the 
opportunities of rivals.  Under exclusive dealing a firm, typically a retailer or other intermediary, 
promises to deal exclusively in the supplier's product or service.  An "output contract" does the 
same thing except that it places the exclusivity obligation on the seller rather than the buyer.  In 
the IP context, the exclusive license is a form of output contract, under which the IP holder 
promises to license only one firm for all or a particular subset of production under the license.  
The Patent Act expressly authorizes domestic exclusive patent licenses in 35 U.S.C. §261.  The 
Copyright Act also authorizes exclusive licenses, although without an express territorial 
limitation. 17 U.S.C. §106.   By contrast, § 3 of the Clayton Act makes it unlawful to sell a good 
or article, "whether patented or unpatented" on the condition that the buyer not deal in the goods 
of a competitor, provided that the agreement's effect "may be to substantially lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly...." 15 U.S.C. §14.  In addition, anticompetitive exclusionary 
contracts are prohibited by § 1 of the Sherman Act, as well as § 2 if the firm imposing them is a 
monopolist.  See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 2005, which condemned exclusive 
dealing under §2 of the Sherman Act. 
 The Patent Act's explicit authorization of exclusive licenses exists in some tension with 
the Sherman Act's prohibition of anticompetitive contracts.  The tension is partly reduced by the 
first sale doctrine (patent exhaustion), which exhausts the patents in any good once it is sold, thus 
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preventing many instances of post-sale exclusivity enforced by infringement actions.  However, 
that solution is incomplete because it is still possible to license or lease patented goods, and the 
first sale doctrine does not apply unless there is a sale.  The best view is that the antitrust laws 
qualify the Patent Act in those cases where competitive harm can be shown. This is consistent 
with the general rule of statutory interpretation in this area, which is that the simple statutory 
authority to do something is not authority to do so in violation of the antitrust laws.  For 
example, numerous state and some federal corporation acts authorize corporations to acquire the 
stock or assets of other corporations, but that does not mean that they can make an 
anticompetitive stock or asset acquisition in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, which condemns 
anticompetitive mergers. In FTC v. Phoebe-Putney Health Sys., 2013, the Supreme Court held 
that a hospital corporation's statutory power to acquire other hospitals did not immunize an 
anticompetitive acquisition.  Already in the 1916 antitrust decision in United States v. American 
Can the court held that it was unlawful for the defendant to purchase exclusive rights to patented 
can making machinery when the effect was to deny mechanization to rivals.  Because American 
Can made no can making machinery itself, these agreements were purely vertical.  In any event, 
after a lengthy period of hostility the courts now accept that exclusivity provisions in sale or 
license contracts are only infrequently anticompetitive, depending on such factors as the market 
share foreclosed by the agreement, ease of entry, the duration of the contracts and frequency of 
rebidding, and offsetting efficiencies that might justify an exclusive deal (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 
2009-2015). 
 A tying arrangement occurs when a firm conditions the sale of one product or service (the 
"tying" product) on the purchaser's taking of a second product or service (the "tied" product).  
The courts first confronted tying arrangements in patent law cases, long before the antitrust laws 
were enacted (Hovenkamp, 2018a).  Most ties are contractual, which means that the tie is 
imposed by agreement.  A few are "technological," or "tech ties," which means that tying is 
accomplished by a technological design or feature that makes the seller's tying product 
incompatible with the tied products of rivals.  Well known examples are Microsoft's 
"commingling" of the code for the Internet Explorer browser into the Windows operating system 
in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2001; or  Apple's technological tying of its iTunes content 
and devices so that they worked best only when used together, in Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust 
Litigation, 2014.  Another was Kodak’s  introduction of the Instamatic pocket camera, which 
was compatible only with its own film cartridges, approved in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 1979.  Because product design is a unilateral act, technological ties are usually 
treated under antitrust's monopolization provision, § 2 of the Sherman Act.  By contrast, ordinary 
contractual ties are addressed under § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 3 of the Clayton Act, both of 
which require an agreement. 
 Today legal and scholarly opinion has shifted dramatically from the belief expressed in 
the mid-1900s that tying arrangements serve "hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of 
competition," Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 1949, to the view that most ties are 
competitively benign or beneficial.  The Patent Act expressly addresses tying arrangements in 
the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act (35 U.S.C. §271(d)(5)), which provides that patent ties are 
not unlawful unless the tying firm has market power in the tying product.  This provision was 
passed in response to serious excesses in the application of misuse doctrine, which refused to 
enforce patent ties in markets where there was no serious risk of competitive harm.  For example, 
Justice Brandeis's opinion in Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 1931, 
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found patent misuse when the manufacturer of a patented ice box required purchasers of the box 
to use its own unpatentable dry ice.  The market for the unmechanized boxes was competitive 
and dry ice was a common commodity produced in "carbonic" plants in many places. 
 Proving unlawful tying under the antitrust laws requires proof of tying product market 
power. In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink Inc., 2006, the Supreme Court held that 
this power may not be inferred simply from the existence of a patent covering the tying product.  
Beyond that, the analysis depends in part on whether the tying and tied products are used in fixed 
or variable proportions.  The tie of Microsoft's Windows computer operating system and its 
Internet Explorer browser is a fixed proportion tie.  A buyer purchases one copy of each, 
although she might use them in different proportions.  The most common anticompetitive 
rationale for such a tie is exclusion of rivals in the tied product market, which requires that the 
firm employing the tie have dominance in the tying market.  For example, by tying Windows and 
Internet Explorer (initially by contract and later by technological integration of the code), 
Microsoft was able to dry up the market for independent web browser Netscape.  However, fixed 
proportion ties can also be beneficial when joint production or distribution reduces costs or 
makes a product work better.  Many fixed proportion ties are a consequence of nothing more 
than technological improvement, which often proceeds by making products more integrated 
(Hovenkamp, 2018a).  For example, IBM's desktop computers were attacked as tying 
arrangements to the extent that they merged processors, motherboards, controllers, storage 
devices, and memory into a single box.  Previously these products had been sold separately and 
connected by cables, making it possible for one person to sell the processing box and another the 
disc drive, etc. But the new systems were more reliable, faster, and cheaper (Fisher, 1983). In 
sum, overly aggressive use of the law governing technological tying can serve to limit 
innovation.  Thus the decision in California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 1979, rejected 
the claim that innovative product integration resulting in a technological tie was simple “design 
manipulation” intended to ruin competing disc drive manufacturers. 
 Variable proportion ties can serve all of the same functions as fixed proportion ties.  In 
addition, however, variable proportioning can operate as metering or price discrimination 
devices.  These are usually either competitively harmless or beneficial to the extent that they 
increase overall output.  For example, the manufacturer of a printer that uses ink cartridges might 
tie the printer and the cartridges, either by contract or technological design.  It then drops the 
price of the printer, often substantially and sometimes even to zero, but charges a premium for 
the ink cartridges.  The result of this practice is that the firm obtains a higher overall return from 
high intensity users who consume more ink.  This is a form of second degree price 
discrimination which results in larger printer sales to the extent the printer price is lower, but also 
captures more revenue from higher intensity users.  In most cases consumers as a group are 
better off, although high intensity consumers may be injured (Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, 2015).  
While such ties may reduce welfare if the firm has an absolute monopoly in the tying product 
and the tie reduces output (Elhauge & Nalebuff, 2017), they clearly increase welfare in cases 
where the seller is not a monopolist or in collusion with the other sellers in the market.  In such 
cases any purchaser required to pay a monopoly price will purchase from a different seller 
(Hovenkamp, 2018a).  In virtually all litigated variable proportion tie cases the seller is not a 
monopolist, and often it is not even among the largest firms in the market.  For example, in 
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 2017, a variable proportion tying case that the 
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Supreme Court decided under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Lexmark’s share of the highly 
competitive computer printer market was less than 5% (Hovenkamp, 2018b). 
 Variable proportion ties are also commonly used by franchisors, such as those in the fast 
food industry, where the tying product is commonly trademarked or occasionally copyrighted 
rather than patented.  For example, the franchisor might charge a very low price or even zero for 
the right to a franchise, but then place an overcharge on various food products or supplies that 
the franchisee uses in variable proportions.  As a result, the franchisor makes more money from 
franchisees that sell more.  See, e.g., Queen City Pizza Inc. v. Domino's Pizza Inc., 1998. 
Importantly, the profitability of these variable proportion ties does not depend on the seller's 
market power, but only on sufficient product differentiation or branding to make its tying 
product attractive.  Many of the defendants in franchise tying claims have been relatively minor 
firms.  For example, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 1971, found antitrust liability for a variable 
proportion franchise by a struggling, minor fast food franchisor.  The market power requirement 
was thought to be met because the defendant’s name was trademarked.  As noted earlier, that 
legal conclusion has now been overruled. 
D. Patent Pools 
 In a patent pool, several patent holders license their patents into a common "pool," or 
organization that relicenses them out to members.  The pool may also license to outside 
manufacturers who do not own relevant patents of their own.  While patent pools have existed 
for a long time, in recent decades their growth has been exponential, thanks largely to the rapid 
development of networked products sold by multiple firms.  The products include 
telecommunications and other digital devices as well as computer and video technology. 
 A patent pool is a "horizontal" restraint to the extent that its participants are competitors 
in the product market or license competing technologies.  The relationship among the parties is 
often more complex, however.  First of all, one important value of patent pooling is to facilitate 
the coordinated use of complementary technologies, but firms that produce pure complements 
are not competitors.  Another use, equally or more important in some markets, is to minimize the 
transaction costs of patent management.  For such savings to occur the pool members can have 
any relationship, from competitor, to vertically related, or complementary. 
 Historical rationales for pooling focused on the differences between complements and 
substitutes (Gilbert, 2004; Santore, 2010).   Pooling or cross licensing among different producers 
in the same industry was thought to be procompetitive if the shared patents were complements 
with one another, but more likely to be anticompetitive if they were substitutes (e.g., Shapiro, 
2001).  If a patent is a discrete unit of innovation whose validity and boundaries are easily 
assessed, this distinction makes sense.  Complements are ordinarily used together, meaning that 
joining them can create social benefits.  For example, if one firm owns a patent on a desirable 
lawn mower motor and another owns a patent on a desirable throttle, pooling will enable the two 
firms to produce mowers that have both improvements.  By contrast, substitutes are used in the 
alternative rather than together.  This makes price fixing a more likely explanation. 
 The distinction between complements and substitutes is less important, however, in a 
world where patents are numerous and complex, with many claims, costly to interpret, and of 
uncertain quality (Lerner & Tirole, 2004).  In such a setting, the economics of transaction costs 
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and boundary enforcement dominates other explanations.  That is to say, the modern patent pool 
in information technologies is a type of commons for which sharing with management rules is 
cheaper and more effective than individual appropriation and enforcement. 
 Patent pools for complex information technologies can contain thousands of patents.  For 
example, the MPEG-LA pool for digital video technology controls about 5,000. See 
http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/AboutHistory.aspx. Subsequent to issuance, most of these 
patents have never been assessed for validity and scope.  Even getting a legal opinion on these 
issues can be very costly.  Many of the patents have numerous claims, often making the 
relationship among different patents far more complex than simple substitutes or complements.   
Further, the substitute/complement question often cannot be answered until one examines the 
device that intends to use them.   For example, the licensees of the MPEG-LA pool include 
multiple competing makers of digital cameras and phones, but also producers of complementary 
products such as flash memories, video displays or projectors, film or photo editing software, 
and the like.  Whether two patents are substitutes, complements, or simply not practiced at all 
can depend on the type of device that the manufacturer produces. 
 One illustration of these complex relationships is the Princo litigation in the Federal 
Circuit, which involved shared technology for developing rewritable digital discs.  A feature that 
located the stylus on a rewritable disc came in both patented analog and digital versions.  The 
two versions were substitutes in the product market, because a manufacturer would use one of 
them but not both.  However, at least one claim of the analog version wrote on the digital patent, 
making the two patents legal complements as well.  Regardless of their function, two patents are 
complements if someone cannot practice one without infringing the other. Princo v. ITC, 2010. 
See Bohannan, 2011, at 510–511.  Indeed, not until after costly claim construction would we 
know how the patents relate to one another.  Even then, claim construction reversal rates are 
unacceptably high. Brief of the ABA as Amicus Curiae, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 2014. 
Finally, the relationship between substitutes and complements is relevant to one 
additional factor: in markets where multiple technological alternatives exist, the pooling of 
substitutes may serve to deny access to outsiders.  For example, if there are three known 
technological alternatives for solving a particular problem a pool that acquires the patents to all 
three may be in a position to exclude non-pool members from the product market. 
 A more robust explanation for pooling in high tech information markets comes from the 
theory of commons development (Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2012).  As Ronald Coase argued in 
The Nature of the Firm (Coase, 1937), the boundaries of a firm are determined by its costs of 
doing business.  A firm makes for itself or buys from others, depending on which alternative is 
more profitable.  When it makes something for itself its boundaries expand, and when it buys 
from others they contract (Hovenkamp, 2011a). 
 Property rights, including IPRs, provide the legal power to exclude, but they do not 
always make individual exclusion the best choice.  The traditional property world is full of 
instances, ranging from shared driveways and party walls to community owned tennis courts and 
swimming pools, where individuals share because sharing is cheaper or more productive than 
exclusion.  The same thing has been true for many centuries of so-called common pool resources 
such as fisheries, irrigation rights, or grazing rights.  One hundred fishermen who own a large 
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lake could if they wished build fences cutting the lake into 100 pieces.  But subdividing would be 
costly, would very likely produce many disputes, and would be devastating to the yield of a 
mobile species of fish (Ostrom, 1990).  Patent rights in information technologies are similar.  
While firms are certainly entitled to own patents individually, defining and defending boundaries 
might be much less productive than sharing them reciprocally with others. 
 While patent pools created to limit boundary problems have some similarities to common 
pool resources, they are not identical and some differences are critical to competitive impact.  
Most traditional common pool resources are "rivalrous," which means that each unit taken 
depletes what is left.  Uncontrolled sharing leads to overuse, as shown by the fate of the 
American Bison as well as chronic overfishing in many fishing commons.  For this reason, catch 
or harvest limitations are essential if the commons is to operate efficiently.  Indeed, a principal 
difficulty in commons management is making and enforcing access or harvest rules (Ostrom, 
1990).  By contrast, IPRs are generally nonrivalrous.  An IP right such as a patent can be used 
many times without depleting what is left over.  As a result, output restraints in the product 
market are more suspicious in IP commons than in traditional commons (Bohannan & 
Hovenkamp, 2012).  
 Another difference between modern information technology patent pools and traditional 
commons is the diversity of the participants.  All those sharing rights on a common fishery or 
pasture are likely to be fishermen and ranchers with relatively undifferentiated businesses.  By 
contrast, given the nature of multi-claim patents, those who practice them might be highly 
diverse, producing complements or unrelated technologies as much as they produce substitutes.  
That is clearly true of the previously described MPEG-LA pool.  A complex device such as a 
digital video camera might practice many patents in the pool, while a simple device such as a 
memory chip or photo editing software employs only a few. 
 These differences have led to claims akin to anticompetitive tying.  A firm that is 
required to license all of a pool's package of 5000 patents may complain that it really uses only 
200 of the patents.   In this case, the patents it uses are the "tying product," while the unwanted 
patents are the "tied product."  These antitrust claims nearly always fail, for the simple reason 
that competition is not injured.  Forcing someone to take a bigger product than he might want— 
such as 100 acres of land instead of a single residential lot— might present a bargaining 
problem.  It is not anticompetitive, however, because no one is being excluded. Further, the cost 
of determining which of the pool's patents the complaining licensee actually practiced could be 
much greater than the cost of the license fee itself.  As one court observed in rejecting such an 
antitrust claim, “[I]t is not anticompetitive for a patent pool to include 
numerous potentially blocking patents, patents which may or may not be essential but which are 
more efficient to license as part of the pool than to risk the expense of future litigation.” Nero AG 
v. MPEC LA, LLC, 2010. 
E.  Exclusionary Practices 
1. Walker Process and Unreasonable Infringement Claims 
 By their nature IPRs create a power to exclude.  Asserting that right is protected by 
§271(d)(3) of the Patent Act as well as constitutional protections of the right of access to the 
courts (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2009-2015).  No protection exists, however, for "baseless" claims 
Hovenkamp IP/Competition August,  2017, Page 20 
 
having no foundation in fact or law. The Supreme Court’s decision in Walker Process Equip., 
Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chem. Corp., 1965, recognized that improper patent infringement 
actions could violate §2 of the Sherman Act if they excluded another firm unreasonably.  As 
noted previously, antitrust has little or no role in policing pre-issuance patent applicant conduct.  
Many Walker Process cases, including Walker Process itself, involve some pre-issuance 
conduct.  In Walker Process the patent applicant failed to inform the patent examiner about sales 
made prior to patent application that, if disclosed, would have barred the patent.  See 35 U.S.C. 
§102(a)(1).  Other cases have involved other forms of inequitable conduct before the USPTO, 
including failures to inform the examiner of known prior art that would have defeated 
patentability. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 1997.  Importantly, however, merely 
obtaining a patent improperly is not an antitrust violation.  Further the patent system has 
numerous remedies for improper conduct before the USPTO.  Walker Process itself involves the 
post-issuance practice of filing an infringement suit, or engaging in other enforcement activity 
such as a threat to sue, on a patent that the owner should reasonably have known to be invalid or 
unenforceable under the circumstances. 
 Antitrust liability for Walker Process violations requires not only the improper 
infringement action, but also a structural basis for thinking that the lawsuit either perpetuates or 
threatens to create a market monopoly.  This makes the antitrust remedy much less readily 
available than the "exceptional case" remedy in §285 of the Patent Act, which authorizes a judge 
to award attorney’s fees against a patentee who makes an improper claim or commits other 
litigation misconduct.  The Supreme Court's decision in Octane Fitness v. ICON Health and 
Fitness, 2014, made such awards easier to obtain.  At this writing it remains to be seen if this 
decision will have any impact on the availability of antitrust remedies. One 2014 decision did 
find some basis for comparison.  Tyco Healtcare Group LP v. Mutual Pharma Co., Inc., 2014. 
 As formulated, Walker Process reaches no more than a small portion of socially harmful 
infringement actions.  It applies in cases where questions of validity or infringement are 
relatively clear and, given that, the patent holder has sued unreasonably.  A far larger number of 
harmful infringement actions arise out of problems of "notice failure" (Menell & Scotchmer, 
2007; Menell & Meurer, 2013; Hovenkamp, 2011b).  Because patent infringement does not 
require advance notice of someone else's patents, many innocent innovators are later caught by 
surprise simply because the cost of searching patents or interpreting their claims is so high and 
the results so unreliable.  These are features of the patent system itself, however, and generally 
cannot be remedied by the antitrust laws. 
2. Acquisitions 
 Section 261 of the Patent Act expressly authorizes patentees to assign their patents to 
others, although it does not authorize anticompetitive assignments.  Even monopolists should be 
entitled to acquire technology that they need to improve their own products or processes.  
Nevertheless, a few qualifications are important.  First, to improve its own technology a 
dominant firm requires no more than a nonexclusive license.  Second acquiring a patent in order 
to improve one’s own technology necessitates practicing the patent; acquisition and nonuse does 
nothing to improve the acquirer’s own product, but may serve to exclude rivals from access to 
alternative technologies.  Third, under some circumstances the acquisition of exclusive rights in 
competing patents can be a significant threat to competition, particularly when the patents 
represent all of the best alternatives for operating in some market.  Suppose, for example, that 
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patent portfolios Alpha, Beta, and Gamma represent the only three commercially feasible ways 
of providing a particular service.  If a dominant firm acquired exclusive rights in all three it 
would be able to exclude competitors from the market even though it would likely be practicing 
only one of the three alternatives.  Such acquisitions of competing portfolios should be 
challengeable as unlawful mergers under § 7 of the Clayton Act, which expressly applies to asset 
as well as stock acquisitions.  The courts have repeatedly held that a patent is a qualifying 
“asset,” provided that anticompetitive effects are shown (Areeda & Hovenkamp. 2009-15).  If 
market dominance results, the acquisitions could also be unlawful monopolization under §2 of 
the Sherman Act, at least if followed by an infringement action. For example, in Intellectual 
Ventures I, LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 2015, the court held that a non-practicing entity’s 
acquisition of some 3,500 patents covering an entire segment of banking industry and subsequent 
enforcement could amount to unlawful monopolization.  See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, 2017; 3 Areeda 
and Hovenkamp (2009-2015), ¶707 (2017 Supp.).  If the firm has acquired only one or two patents, 
however, the courts have been willing to sustain infringement actions even if one or more of the 
patents are unused, as the Supreme Court held in the Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper 
Bag Co., 1908 and the Federal Circuit much more recently confirmed in Trebro Mfr., Inc. v. 
Firefly Equip., LLC, 2014.  Neither case raised an antitrust issue. See Hovenkamp and Cotter, 
2015. 
3.  Refusal to License 
 Neither United States antitrust law nor the Patent Act recognizes a general duty to license 
a patent or to share patented technology.  Indeed, §271(d)(4) of the Patent Act provides that a 
refusal to license is not "misuse or illegal extension of the patent right...." This language appears 
to refer to unilateral refusals to deal, but some language in a  Federal Circuit dissent in Princo 
Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 2010, suggested that it could reach concerted refusals to deal as well. 
(Bohannan & Hovenkamp, 2011). That rule, if accepted, would be unfortunate, for concerted 
refusals have significantly more anticompetitive potential than unilateral refusals (Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, 2009-15). 
 In its decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 1997, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the antitrust laws did give Kodak a duty to sell patented parts to independent repair 
persons who wished to fix its high-speed photocopiers.  The decision has been widely criticized 
and was expressly rejected by the Federal Circuit in the ISO Antitrust Litigation, 2000, a similar 
case involving Xerox. As of this writing the Supreme Court has not resolved the split (Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, 2009-15). 
 Currently the courts have not settled on the scope of a patentee's duty to license a patent 
encumbered by a FRAND commitment, or a promise made as part of a standard setting process 
to license on "fair reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms."  Patentees generally make these 
commitments as a condition of having their patents declared "standards essential," or part of the 
technology to be adopted by a network.  In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 2014,  a panel of the 
Federal Circuit split three ways on the question.  Nonetheless, it seems clear that if the owner of 
a FRAND-encumbered patent has executed a contractual promise to license to all on FRAND 
terms, then an infringement suit in conflict with that contractual obligation would be improper, 
as the court found in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2015.  It could occasion antitrust 
liability, although antitrust would not necessarily be the best vehicle for assessing it because the 
challenger must also establish market power and the creation of monopoly.  The Patent Act’s 
Hovenkamp IP/Competition August,  2017, Page 22 
 
own remedial measures such as the previously discussed “exceptional case” provision, would 
provide a more direct route to relief, although not treble damages. 
 One must also distinguish between simple and conditional refusals to grant an IP license 
or sell a good covered by an IP right.  Section 3 of the Clayton act, discussed above, expressly 
limits certain conditional licensing contracts that threaten competition, and expressly covers 
goods that are patented as well as unpatented. For example, a tying arrangement can readily be 
construed as a refusal to sell or license a tying product unless the buyer also takes the tied 
product.  The legality of a conditional refusal depends on the legality of the underlying 
condition. 
 Another important distinction is between compulsory licensing as a general antitrust duty 
and compulsory licensing as a remedy for some other antitrust violation.  In many antitrust cases 
the courts have determined that compulsory licensing is the best way to undo the effects of some 
other violation.  Merger remedies often require IP licensing as a condition for approval and many 
structural breakups, such as the one that dismantled the nationwide AT&T telephone network, 
could not have succeeded unless each of the spun off companies received nonexclusive licenses 
to the parent's intellectual property portfolio. United States v. AT&T, 1982. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the question of compulsory licensing duties is an important 
and controversial one, raising serious questions in market dominating networks, lifesaving 
pharmaceuticals, national defense, and other areas involving questions about patent social value.  
Antitrust is a poor vehicle for resolving most of these issues.  It offers no useful tools for 
determining when such a dealing obligation is socially necessary.  Nor does it have any 
mechanisms for setting a price, other than through ordinary damages measurement tools. 
IV. IP Law's Own Internal Rules for Facilitating Competition 
 Intellectual property law also has internal rules for facilitating competition in the scope or 
use of IPRs (Cotter, 2006).  Most of these rules are quite different from antitrust rules.  IP law's 
internal competition rules do not require a market definition, proof of anticompetitive market 
exclusion, or even an attempt to measure the impact of a particular practice on price or output.  
Rather they are best seen as rules that limit IP "overreaching" of various kinds. 
A. The First Sale (Exhaustion) Doctrine 
  Patent and copyright law's "first sale," or exhaustion rule, limits the power of a right 
holder to restrict the use or resale of a protected good once it has been sold. Both the patent and 
copyright exhaustion rules were originally judge made, but subsequently Congress enacted the 
copyright first sale doctrine into the statute, at 17 U.S.C. §109(a).   In its simplest form the 
exhaustion rule states that the sale, not the license or lease, of a patented or copyrighted good 
exhausts the right holder's legal interest in that particular copy.  The exhaustion doctrine has 
been used to strike down resale price restrictions, under both copyright (Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 1908); and patent (United States v.  Univis Lens Co., 1942).  It has been applied to quasi-
exclusive dealing restrictions in patent (Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc 2008), and has 
also been used to strike down limitations on where purchased goods can be sold, in both 
copyright (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2013) and patent (Adams v. Burke, 1873). 
(Hovenkamp, 2011c).  In 2017 the Supreme Court held that a patentee could not avoid 
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exhaustion by making its sale “conditional” on certain post-sale restrictions, no matter how 
clearly the condition was stated.  Lexmark, Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 2017.  The Court 
located the policy rationale for this concern in the common law rules limiting restraints on 
alienation.  (See Hovenkamp, 2017b). 
 Even though the first sale rule reaches many of the same practices that antitrust law 
reaches, such as tying, exclusive dealing, or resale price maintenance, it cannot be counted as an 
antitrust provision.  Its application is completely indifferent to competitive effects, requiring only 
that there be a qualifying "sale."  Once such a sale has been found6 the post-sale restraint 
becomes unenforceable per se, without regard to competitive effects.   One view of the doctrine 
is that it is intended to limit the reach of patent law in order to leave space for other bodies of 
commercial law (Duffy & Hynes, 2015; Hovenkamp, 2011c).  Another view is that it is a 
creature of federalism, limiting the reach of federal IP supremacy in order to ensure that states 
retain the power to control post-sale restraints on protected goods. (Hovenkamp, 2016b). 
B. "Misuse" 
 The misuse doctrine originated in patent law and was later expanded to copyright.  It is 
entirely judge made, and the only references to it in the Patent Act are limitations contained in 
the Patent Misuse Reform Act, 35 U.S.C. §271(d), rather than recognition.  Almost from the 
beginning misuse doctrine got off to a troublesome start.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 1917 case, where a version of the 
doctrine was first recognized, almost surely involved an anticompetitive restraint.  The owner of 
a market dominant projector sold it subject to a license restriction permitting projection only of 
its own films.  But the Clayton Act had already been passed, and in 15 U.S.C. §14 it expressly 
prohibited patent ties that injured competition. To be sure, the competition issue was raised as a 
defense to an infringement action rather than an antitrust claim, but by this time the Supreme 
Court had already held in Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 1909, that 
illegality under the antitrust laws was a complete defense to an enforcement action, such as a 
breach of contract suit. Therefore, a patent-law-generated misuse doctrine was unnecessary. 
  In subsequent decades, misuse doctrine was applied aggressively to patent tying, 
exclusive dealing, royalty extensions and other licensing arrangements where injury to 
competition was nowhere in view.  It is no wonder that during a later era of antitrust contraction 
both courts and commentators severely criticized "misuse" unless its application was limited to 
conduct that violated the antitrust laws.  See, e.g., USM corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 1982.  See also 
Bohannan, 2011; Lim, 2013. 
The courts have also recognized copyright "misuse" where the copyright infringement 
plaintiff had attempted to "sequester" uncopyrightable public data in a copyrighted database 
program.  Judge Posner made clear that the violation in question was not of the antitrust laws.  It 
was a unilateral act and there was no finding that the infringement plaintiff had sufficient market 
                                                          
6 But see Bowman v. Monsanto co., 133 S.Ct. 1761 (2013), which held that  exhaustion did not apply to 
self-replicating seed where the replanted seed was a subsequent generation and not the selfsame seed that 
the infringement defendant had purchased. 
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power.7  Rather, the concern was strictly one of copyright law, which both protects copyrighted 
content but also seeks to ensure that material in the public domain can be accessed. 
 In 2015, the Supreme Court breathed new life into one particular variation of the misuse 
doctrine.  In  Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t Co., LLC, 2015, it adhered to the much-criticized rule 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Brulotte v. Thys, 1964, that a license agreement basing 
royalties on post-expiration patent use is unenforceable per se.  Kimble did not attempt to justify 
the original Brulotte rule, but held only that reliance plus stare decisis required adherence.  See 
Hovenkamp (2015b). 
 The overuse and subsequent undermining of "misuse" doctrine was an opportunity lost.  
Courts have legitimate concerns about IP overreaching as a matter of intellectual property law.  
The 70-year-long escapade, stretching from the 1917 Motion Picture Patents case to the 1988 
Patent Misuse Reform Act, represented gross overreaching in tying doctrine under both misuse 
and antitrust, including the doctrine developed in Morton Salt co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 1942, 
that someone who was misusing its patent as against one firm could not sue anyone else, even an 
admitted infringer.  In U.S. Gypsum vs. National Gypsum the Supreme Court, globalized that 
remedy, holding that once misuse was found the patent would be unenforceable against the entire 
world until the misuse was "purged." 
A revitalized doctrine of patent misuse should do two things.  First, it should identify 
conduct that is socially harmful because it threatens the balance between exclusion and access 
created by the intellectual property laws themselves.  Second, the remedy should ordinarily be 
limited to an injunction against the practice, or recognition that violation of the practice is not an 
act of infringement. (Bohannan, 2011). 
C. Competition-based Limitations on "Functionality" Protection 
 One important limiting principle of IP law is that protection of a "function" must come by 
means of a utility patent, which is more difficult to obtain than other IPRs and has a shorter 
duration than copyrights or trademarks.  For this purpose, design patents are treated more like 
copyrights and trademarks rather than patents. 
 The fundamental principle undergirding functionality limitations is that people should not 
be able to use IPRs to create product monopolies any more than is justified by the limitations 
inherent in utility patents.   An important corollary is that people should not be able to turn other 
IPRs into quasi-patent rights in order to broaden their scope or duration.  The grandparent of the 
doctrine is Baker v. Selden, 1879, which held that a copyrighted book teaching the author's 
method of accounting served to protect against making unauthorized copies of the book, but not 
against using or teaching the method itself.  That decision was followed in Bikram’s Yoga 
College v. Evolation Yoga, 2015, holding that a book illustrating yoga poses and movements did 
not prohibit someone from teaching those motions in a class.  In the area of trademark or trade 
                                                          
7 Assessment Tech. of Wisconsin., LLC v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.2d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 2003). The court 
also relied on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 
1990), which found misuse in a restriction on a copyright licensee's development of new technology, even 
though that restraint did not violate the antitrust laws,   See also Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
776 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2015) (concurring opinion arguing that copyright holder committed misuse by 
trying to leverage copyrighted design into prohibition on product sale in United States). 
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dress, the Supreme Court's important decision in Traffix Devices v. Market Displays, 2001, held 
that a traffic sign support that was an essential element of an expired utility patent could not be 
grandparented into a trademark, effectively extending the right over this functional design 
indefinitely.8  Similarly, copyright protection does not extend to purely functional names or 
commands in computer programs if good alternatives are lacking and the result serves to limit 
the ability of rival programmers to replicate that function. E.g., Lotus Development Corp. v. 
Borland Intern., Inc., 1995; Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2014. 
 
 Several lower courts have also held that design patents cannot be expanded so as to 
perform a utility function, thus excluding the products of rivals.  For example, in Chrysler 
Motors Corp. v. Autobody Panes of Ohio, 1990, and Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 1996, 
the Federal Circuit held that the owner of design patents could not use a design feature to 
exclude complementary products.  In the first, it rejected Chrysler’s attempt to enforce a design 
patent on an automobile bumper mount so as to exclude competing bumper makers who could 
not make a Chrysler-compatible bumper without infringing the design patent.  In the second it 
prevented the owner of a design patent on a door key from enforcing a patent so as to make 
competitors' keys incompatible with its locks.  In both cases the design patentees were 
attempting to create "technological ties."  No determination of the patentee's market power was 
made, and the ties may or may not have been antitrust violations.  But that is beside the point.  
The issue was sequestration, not monopoly.  Utility patents may permit firms to keep rivals out 
of the product market, but design patents should not. 
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